The Bloated IP Protocol By Rui L. Aguiar, Universidade de Aveiro/Instituto de TelecomunicaC'C5es Abstract: Early objectives of the datagram ( :-) ) networks aimed to simply provide reliability. IP appeared as a way of having a simple distributed communication system, without a central control entity. Today, IP is looked at as the communication panacea, able to provide the infrastructure to the "communication society", incorporating security, multimedia, quality of service, mobility, multicast, and so on... Claim: Somewhere on the way from the IP protocol to the Internet protocols, we lost track of what we were doing. Lets start by one of the objectives of the IP protocol, years ago: "simple, unmanaged". Is this what our research is doing? A simple answer would be "yes, we are using only/mostly IP". But this neglects the fundamental separation between control and data planes of a communication network. When we faced the problems of quality of service, we happily set our minds in the development of (not one) two different frameworks, requiring a more or less complex control plane, and adequate signalling protocols. The fact that these techniques were never originally planned to operate in a "disruptive network" environment did not affect the research work. When required to incorporate multicast, the break was even more radical. Now, the whole approach was to develop a separate control (routing plane) overlaid to the IP network. Mobility has been a disruptive challenge for IP networks. After all, they were never developed for route changes every second. So a different way of addressing this appears, with an juvenile notion of identifier and locator inside MIP. The problems face with these led then to the development of multiple proposals for speeding the mobility process, bringing more complexity and still a not satisfactory solution. The fact that current telecom networks operate easily with concepts such as mobility and number portability seems to have been somewhat neglected in our claims of mobility improvements. Security is one of the least complicated developments - curiously it is one of the few that affects significantly the data place, and one of the few that will probably face several law problems, with requirements like legal data interception. For multimedia, the developments were, to say the least, a reflection of the whole story of IP. Besides many other small control protocols, IETF came with SIP - a great small thing in the beginning. The current amount of features that SIP can provide today lost many years ago its original simplicity. So, are we still trying to have simple distributed system, without a central entity? Let's go back to this first objective of IP development. "reliable distributed system, without a central control entity". Well, root DNS attacks for DoS is a current major concern, a source of potential economic hazards - and a favourite target for high-profile hacking. On the other hand, communications infrastructure today is no longer the circuit switch of 30 years ago - we are now on the digitized cell/TDM/WDM world. Yes, many of these were developments influenced by the datagram concepts. But current restoration capabilities of telecom providers are several orders of magnitude above those achievable by route adaptation inside IP networks, with recovery times inferior to one second. And IP is being transported in networks with these capabilities - in an environment where more and more the physical access to any site will become a single wire administratively shared by different entities: even with two different ISPs, an institution may be connected to the Internet through a single line, which subverts the whole idea of having IP as a reliable communication infrastructure - if the underlying carrier infrastructure does not recover faults, IP may well be physically unable to do so. A complete different point to this "no central entity" objective is the fact that this no longer means an assurance of reliability. With the development of virus technology, distribution may actually mean an increase on the number of points of failure, that can later contaminate the whole network. In fact, current security practices move on the direction of a central control entity, blocking and controlling access to resources. And this goes without discussing business aspects - operators, service providers expect to be paid (even on community networks some kind of reward needs to be in place). So, what are we doing? Claim: IP needs to be rethought - it is not now the solution, but the problem. We do not have any longer a simple control plane for IP networks. It would be an error to keep it as the basis for the future: it will be hard enough that we have it as legacy. So, if we are talking about new networking infrastructures.... let's keep IP in its small place, and exploit the fundamental requirements on communications - and not on IP networks.