7.5 Key Distribution and Certification

In section 7.2 we saw that a drawback of symmetric key cryptography was the need for the two communicating parties to have agreed upon their secret key ahead of time. With public key cryptography, this a priori agreement on a secret value is not needed. However, as we saw in our discussion of authentication protocol ap5.0 in Section 7.3, public key encryption has its own difficulties, in particular the problem of obtaining someone's true public key. Both of these problems – determining a shared key for symmetric key cryptography, and securely obtaining the public key for public key cryptography – can be solved using a trusted intermediary. For symmetric key cryptograghy , the trusted intermediary is called a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which is a single, trusted network entity with whom one has established a shared secret key. We will see that one can use the KDC to obtain the shared keys needed to communicate securely with all other network entities. For public key cryptography, the trusted intermediary is called a Certification Authority (CA). A certification authority certifies that a public key belongs to a particular entity (a person or a network entity). For a certified public key, if one can safely trust the CA that the certified the key, then one can be sure about to whom the public key belongs. Once a public key is certified, then it can be distributed from just about anywhere, including a public key server, a personal Web page or a diskette.

7.5.1 The Key Distribution Center

Suppose once again that Bob and Alice want to communicate using symmetric key cryptography. They have never met (perhaps they just met in an on-line chat room) and thus have not established a shared secret key in advance. How can they now agree on a secret key, given that they can only communicate with each other over the network? A solution often adopted in practice is to use a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC).

The KDC is a server that shares a different secret symmetric key with each registered user. This key might be manually installed at the server when a user first registers. The KDC knows the secret key of each user and each user can communicate securely with the KDC using this key. Let's see how knowledge of this one key allows a user to securely obtain a key for communicating with any other registered user. Suppose that Alice and Bob are users of the KDC; they only know their individual key, KA-KDC and KB-KDC, respectively, for communicating securely with the KDC. Alice takes the first step, and they proceed as illustrated in Figure 7.5-1.

The Key Distribution Center
Figure 7.5-1: Setting up a one-time session key using a Key Distribution Center

7.5.2 Kerberos

Kerberos [RFC 1510, Neuman 1994] is an authentication service developed at MIT that uses symmetric key encryption techniques and a Key Distribution Center. Although it is conceptually the same as the generic KDC we described in section 7.5.1, its vocabulary is slightly different. Kerberos also contains several nice variations and extensions of the basic KDC mechanisms. Kerberos was designed to authenticate users accessing network servers and was initially targeted for use within a single administrative domain such as a campus or company. Thus, Kerberos is framed in the language of users who want to access network services (servers) using application-level network programs such as Telnet (for remote login) and NFS (for access to remote files), rather than than human-to-human conversants who want to authenticate themselves to each other, as in our examples above. Nonetheless, the key (pun intended) underlying techniques remains the same.

The Kerberos Authentication Server (AS) plays the role of the KDC. The AS is the repository of not only the secret keys of all users (so that each user can communicate securely with the AS) but also information about which users have access privileges to which services on which network servers. When Alice wants to access a service on Bob (who we now think of as a server), the protocol closely follows our example in Figure 7.5-1:

The most recent version of Kerberos (V5) provides support for multiple Authentication Servers, delegation of access rights, and renewable tickets. [Kaufman 95] [RFC 1510] provide ample details.

7.5.3 Public Key Certification

One of the principle features of public key encryption is that it is possible for two entities to exchange secret messages without having to exchange secret keys. For example, when Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, she simply encrypts the message with Bob's public key and sends the encrypted message to Bob; she doesn't need to know Bob's secret (i.e., private) key, nor does Bob need to know her secrect key. Thus, public key cryptography obviates the need for KDC infrastructure, such as Kerberos.

Of course, with public key encryption, the communicating entities still have to exchange public keys. A user can make its public key pubicly available in many ways, e.g., by posting the key on the user's personal Web page, placing the key in a public key server, or by sending the key to a correspondent by e-mail. A Web commerce site can place its public key on its server in a manner that browsers automatically download the public key when connecting to the site. Routers can place their public keys on public key servers, thereby allowing other browsers and network entities to retrieve them.

There is, however, a subtle, yet critical, problem with public key cryptography. To gain insight to this problem, let's consider an Internet commerce example. Suppose that Alice is in the pizza delivery business and she accepts orders over the Internet. Bob, a pizza lover, sends Alice a plaintext message which includes his home address and the type of pizza he wants. In this message, Bob also includes a digital signature (e.g.,, an encrypted message digest for the original plaintext message). As discussed in Section 7.4, Alice can obtain Bob's public key (from his personal Web page, a public key server, or from an e-mail message) and verify the digital signature. In this manner Alice makes sure that Bob (rather than some adolescent prankster) indeed made the order.

This all sounds fine until clever Trudy comes along. As shown in Figure 7.5-2, Trudy decides to play a prank. Trudy sends a message to Alice in which she says she is Bob, gives Bob's home address, and orders a pizza. She also attaches a digital signature, but she attaches the signature by signing the message digest with her (i.e., Trudy's) private key. Trudy also masquerades as Bob by sending Alice Trudy's public key but saying that it belongs to Bob. In this example, also will apply Trudy's public key (thinking that it is Bob's) to the digital signature and conclude that the plaintext message was indeed created by Bob. Bob will be very surprised when the delivery person brings to his home a pizza with everything on it! Here, as in the flawed authentication scenario in Figure 7.3-7, the man-in-the-middle attack is the room cause of our difficulties.

Trudy masquerades as Bob using public key cryptography
Figure 7.5-2: Trudy masquerades as Bob using public key cryptography.

We see from this example that in order for public key cryptography to be useful, entities (users, browsers, routers, etc.) need to know for sure that they have the public key of the entity with which they are communicating. For example, when Alice is communicating with Bob using public key cryptography, she needs to know for sure that the public key that is supposed to be Bob's is indeed Bob's.

Binding a public key to a particular entity is typically done by a certification authority (CA), which validates identities and issue certificates. A CA has the following roles:

Bob obtains a certificate from the certification authority
Figure 7.5-3: Bob obtains a certificate from the certification authority.

Let us now see how certificates can be used to combat pizza-ordering pranksters, like Trudy, and other undesirables. When Alice recieves Bob's order, she gets Bob's certificate, which may be on his Web page, in an e-mail message or in a certificate server. Alice uses the CA's public key to verify that the public key in the certificate is indeed Bob's. If we assume that the public key of the CA itself is known to all (for example, it could published in a trusted, public, and well-known place, such as The New York Times, so that it is known to all and can not be spoofed), then Alice can be sure that she is indeed dealing with Bob.

Both the International Telecommunication Union and the IETF have developed standards for Certification Authorities. ITU X.509 [ITU 1993] specifies an authentication service as well as a specific syntax for certificates. RFC 1422 [RFC 1422] describes CA-based key management for use with secure Internet e-mail. It is compatible with X.509 but goes beyond X.509 by establishing procedures and conventions for a key management architecture. Figure 7.5-4 describes some of the important field in a certificate.

Figure 7.5-4: Selected fields in a X.509 and RFC 1422 public key certificate
Field name Description
version version number of X.509 specification
serial number CA-issued unique identifier for a certificate
signature specifies the algorithm used by Ca to "sign" this certificate
issuer name identity of CA issuing this certificate, in so-called
Distinguished Name(DN) [RFC 1779] format
validity period start and end of period of validity for certificate
subject name identity of entity whose public key is associated with this
certificate, in DN format
subject public key the subject's public key as well as an indication of the public key
algorithm (and algorithm parameters) to be used with this key

With the recent boom in electronic commerce and the consequent widespread need for secure transactions, there has been increased interest in Certification Authorities. Among the companies providing CA services are Cybertrust [Cybertrust 1990] Verisign [Verisign 1999] and Netscape [Netscape 1999].

A certificate issued by the US Postal Service, as viewed through a Netscape browser, is shown in Figure 7.5-5.

A US Postol Service issued certificate
Figure 7.5-5: A US Postal Service issued certificate

7.5.4 One-Time Session Keys

We have seen above that a one-time session key is generated by a KDC for use in symmetric key encryption of a single session between two parties. By using the one-time session keys from the KDC, a user is freed from having to establish a priori its own shared key for each and every network entity with whom it wishes to communicate. Instead, a user need only have one shared secret key for communicating with the KDC, and will receive one-time session keys from the KDC for all of its communication with other network entities.

One time session keys are also used in public key cryptography. Recall from our discussion in section 7.2.2, that a public key encryption technique such as RSA is orders of magnitude more computationally expensive that a symmetric key system such as DES. Thus, public key systems are often used for authentication purposes. Once two parties have authenticated each other, they then use public-key-encrypted communication to agree on a shared one-time symmetric session key. This symmetric session key is then used to encrypt the remainder of the communication using a more efficient symmetric encryption technique, such as DES.

References