

# Internet Security

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## General information

- ❑ Area: BKS – Hauptstudium Vertiefer
  - Will be integrated into a Module system of SECT and INET
- ❑ Time
  - Thursday: 14:00 – 16:00
- ❑ Room
  - MA 043
- ❑ Language
  - English (questions can be asked in German!)
- ❑ Web site
  - [http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/teaching/ss09/is\\_ss09/](http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/teaching/ss09/is_ss09/)
- ❑ Mailing list
  - see Web page

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## General information

- Exam
  - For those that need it ☺
  - Oral or written exam after semester end (depends on # of participants)
  
- Prerequisite: some knowledge of
  - How the Internet works
  - How operating systems work
  - Little bit of undergraduate math for cryptography
  
- Additional contact persons:
  - Gregor Maier (INET) and Collin Mulliner (SECT)

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## What is this course about?

- Network security? Not quite!
  
- Focus:
  - Security of networked **applications**
    - Security of Web browsers
  - Protection of network **infrastructure**

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## Topics

- ❑ **Basics of secure network protocol design**
  - Using cryptography (not a cryptography class!)
  - The role of correct software
  
- ❑ **Practical focus**
  - This is not a pure academic-style course
  - You'll see real security holes
  - A lot of (in)security is about doing the unexpected
  - „Think sideways“

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## How to think about insecurity

- ❑ Bad guys don't follow rules
- ❑ Need to understand what sort of attacks are possible to compromise a system
  - Prerequisite to understand what to protect in a system!
- ❑ **This is not the same as actually launching them!**
  - Taking a security class is not an excuse for hacking
  - Hacking is any form of unauthorized access, including exceeding authorized permissions
  - The fact that a file or computer is not properly protected is no excuse for unauthorized access

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## Reading

- Kaufman, Perlman, and Spencer.  
Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World,  
Second Edition, Prentice Hall, 2002
- Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin.  
Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker,  
Second Edition, Addison-Wesley Professional 2003
- Garfinkel, Spafford, and Schwartz.  
Practical Unix & Internet Security,  
O'Reilly Media, Inc.
- Matt Bishop.  
Computer Security: Art and Science,  
Addison-Wesley Professional 2002
- ... (see Web)
- **Research papers** (see Web)

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
## Network security

### Overview

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## Dichotomy: hosts

- ❑ Is (or can be) well-controlled
- ❑ There are well-developed authentication and authorization models
- ❑ Strong notion
  - Of „privileged“ state
  - What programs can use/do



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## Dichotomy: networks

- ❑ None of the above
- ❑ Anyone can (and does) connect to the network
- ❑ Connectivity can only be controlled in very small, well-regulated environments, and maybe not even then
- ❑ Different OS have different – or no – notions of userIDs and privileges

=> notions of privilege is missing

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## Networking

- ❑ Networks interconnect
- ❑ Networks always interconnect
- ❑ Interconnections happen everywhere 😊  
but mainly at the edges


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## Failures

- ❑ Benign failures
  - Most network failures are benign
  - Programs allow for such failures
    - Data corruption
    - Timeouts
    - Dead hosts
    - Routing problems
    - ...
- ❑ Rule of thumb:
  - Anything that can happen by accident  
can happen malicious  
-> much more dangerous!

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# Failures and Faults



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## Principle: trust nothing

- ❑ A host can/should trust **nothing** that comes over the wire!
- ❑ Any desired protections have to be explicitly supplied
- ❑ There may be help from lower layers that supply protection
  - Yet those layers have to be based on the same principle!
  - Research on such lower layer protection is a very hot topic and far from being solved!

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## Attitude question

- ❑ Unproductive attitudes
  - „Why would anyone ever do that?“
  - „That attack is too complicated“
  - „No one knows how this system works, so they can't attack it“
- ❑ Better attitudes
  - „Programming Satan's Computer“ (Ross Anderson)
  - „Assume that serial number 1 of any device is delivered to the enemy“
  - „You hand your packets to the enemy to deliver; you receive all incoming packets from the enemy“

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## Network security tools

- ❑ Cryptography
- ❑ Network-based access control (firewalls and more)
- ❑ Monitoring
  
- ❑ Protocol analysis by formal verification
  
- ❑ *Paranoid design!*

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## Protocol design

- ❑ Heavy use of crypto and authentication
- ❑ Ensure that sensitive fields are protected
- ❑ Make authentication bilateral
- ❑ Figure out the proper authorization
- ❑ Defend against
  - Eavesdropping
  - Modification
  - Deletion
  - Replay
  - And combinations thereof

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## Buggy software

- ❑ Most network security holes are due to **buggy code**
- ❑ A buggy network-connected program is an insecure one ☹
- ❑ **Correct coding counts for a lot!**

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## Course overview

- ❑ Introduction
  - Attacks and threats, cryptography overview
  - Authentication (Kerberos, SSL)
- ❑ Applications
  - Web, browser, email, ssh
- ❑ Lower layer network security
  - NAT, (IPsec), firewalls
- ❑ Monitoring / information gathering
  - Intrusion detection, network scans
- ❑ Availability
  - Worms, denial of service, network infrastructure

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