

Internet Security

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General information

- ❑ Area: BKS – Hauptstudium Vertiefer
 - Will be integrated into a Module system of SECT and INET
- ❑ Time
 - Thursday: 14:00 – 16:00
- ❑ Room
 - MA 043
- ❑ Language
 - English (questions can be asked in German!)
- ❑ Web site
 - http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/teaching/ss09/is_ss09/
- ❑ Mailing list
 - see Web page

General information

□ Exam

- For those that need it 😊
- Oral or written exam after semester end (depends on # of participants)

□ Prerequisite: some knowledge of

- How the Internet works
- How operating systems work
- Little bit of undergraduate math for cryptography

□ Additional contact persons:

- Gregor Maier (INET) and Collin Mulliner (SECT)

What is this course about?

- ❑ Network security? Not quite!

- ❑ Focus:
 - Security of networked **applications**
 - Security of Web browsers
 - Protection of network **infrastructure**

Topics

- ❑ **Basics of secure network protocol design**
 - Using cryptography (not a cryptography class!)
 - The role of correct software

- ❑ **Practical focus**
 - This is not a pure academic-style course
 - You'll see real security holes
 - A lot of (in)security is about doing the unexpected
 - „Think sideways“

How to think about insecurity

- ❑ Bad guys don't follow rules
- ❑ Need to understand what sort of attacks are possible to compromise a system
 - Prerequisite to understand what to protect in a system!
- ❑ **This is not the same as actually launching them!**
 - Taking a security class is not an excuse for hacking
 - Hacking is any form of unauthorized access, including exceeding authorized permissions
 - The fact that a file or computer is not properly protected is no excuse for unauthorized access

Reading


- ❑ Kaufman, Perlman, and Spencer.
Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World,
Second Edition, Prentice Hall, 2002
- ❑ Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin.
Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker,
Second Edition, Addison-Wesley Professional 2003
- ❑ Garfinkel, Spafford, and Schwartz.
Practical Unix & Internet Security,
O'Reilly Media, Inc.
- ❑ Matt Bishop.
Computer Security: Art and Science,
Addison-Wesley Professional 2002
- ❑ ... (see Web)
- ❑ **Research papers** (see Web)

Network security

Overview

Dichotomy: hosts

- ❑ Is (or can be) well-controlled
- ❑ There are well-developed authentication and authorization models
- ❑ Strong notion
 - Of „privileged“ state
 - What programs can use/do



Dichotomy: networks

- ❑ None of the above
- ❑ Anyone can (and does) connect to the network
- ❑ Connectivity can only be controlled in very small, well-regulated environments, and maybe not even then
- ❑ Different OS have different – or no – notions of userIDs and privileges

=> notions of privilege is missing

Networking

- ❑ Networks interconnect
- ❑ Networks always interconnect
- ❑ Interconnections happen everywhere 😊
but mainly at the edges

Failures

❑ Benign failures

- Most network failures are benign
- Programs allow for such failures
 - Data corruption
 - Timeouts
 - Dead hosts
 - Routing problems
 - ...

❑ Rule of thumb:

- Anything that can happen by accident can happen malicious
 - > much more dangerous!

Principle: trust nothing

- ❑ A host can/should trust **nothing** that comes over the wire!
- ❑ Any desired protections have to be explicitly supplied
- ❑ There may be help from lower layers that supply protection
 - Yet those layers have to be based on the same principle!
 - Research on such lower layer protection is a very hot topic and far from being solved!

Attitude question

❑ Unproductive attitudes

- „Why would anyone ever do that?“
- „That attack is too complicated“
- „No one knows how this system works, so they can't attack it“

❑ Better attitudes

- „Programming Satan's Computer“ (Ross Anderson)
- „Assume that serial number 1 of any device is delivered to the enemy“
- „You hand your packets to the enemy to deliver; you receive all incoming packets from the enemy“

Network security tools

- ❑ Cryptography
- ❑ Network-based access control
(firewalls and more)
- ❑ Monitoring

- ❑ Protocol analysis by formal verification

- ❑ *Paranoid design!*

Protocol design

- ❑ Heavy use of crypto and authentication
- ❑ Ensure that sensitive fields are protected
- ❑ Make authentication bilateral
- ❑ Figure out the proper authorization
- ❑ Defend against
 - Eavesdropping
 - Modification
 - Deletion
 - Replay
 - And combinations thereof

Buggy software

- ❑ Most network security holes are due to **buggy code**
- ❑ A buggy network-connected program is an insecure one 😞
- ❑ **Correct coding counts for a lot!**

Course overview

❑ Introduction

- Attacks and threats, cryptography overview
- Authentication (Kerberos, SSL)

❑ Applications

- Web, browser, email, ssh

❑ Lower layer network security

- NAT, (IPsec), firewalls

❑ Monitoring / information gathering

- Intrusion detection, network scans

❑ Availability

- Worms, denial of service, network infrastructure