Network Security Standards

Key distribution
 Kerberos
 SSL/TLS

Many-to-Many Authentication

How do users prove their identities when requesting services from machines on the network?

**Naive solution:** every server knows every user’s password

- **Insecure:** compromise of one server is enough to compromise all users
- **Inefficient:** to change his password, user must contact every server
Key Distribution - Secret Keys

- What if there are millions of users and thousands of servers?
- Could configure $n^2$ keys
- Better is to use a Key Distribution Center
  - Everyone has one key
  - The KDC knows them all
  - The KDC assigns a key to any pair who need to talk

Goals

- Requirements
  - Security (sniffers and malicious users)
  - Reliability
  - Transparency
    - Users should not be aware of authentication action
    - Entering password is Ok, if done rarely
  - Scalability
- Threats
  - User impersonation: can't trust workstations to verify users’ identities
  - Network address impersonation: Spoofing
  - Eavesdropping, tampering and replay to gain unauthorized access
Solution: trusted third party

- Trusted authentication service on the network
  - Knows all passwords, can grant access to any server
  - Convenient, but also the single point of failure
  - Requires high level of physical security

Key Distribution - Secret Keys

A wants to talk to B

Randomly choose $K_{ab}$

$\{"B", K_{ab}\}_{K_a}$ $\{"A", K_{ab}\}_{K_b}$

$\{\text{Message}\}_{K_{ab}}$
A Common Variant

Alice                KDC                Bob

A wants to talk to B

Randomly choose $K_{ab}$

$\left\{ \text{“B”, } K_{ab} \right\}_{K_a}, \left\{ \text{“A”, } K_{ab} \right\}_{K_b}$

$\left\{ \text{“A”, } K_{ab} \right\}_{K_b}, \left\{ \text{Message} \right\}_{K_{ab}}$

KDC Realms

- KDCs scale up to hundreds of clients, but not millions
- There’s no one who everyone in the world is willing to trust with their secrets
- KDC Realm: a KDC and the users of that KDC
**KDC Realms**

Interorganizational KDC

Lotus KDC <-> SUN KDC <-> MIT KDC

A B C D E F G

---

**Interrealm KDCs**

- How would you talk to someone in another realm?
- How would you know what realm?
- How would you know a path to follow?
- What can bad KDCs do?
- How do you know what path was used? Why do you care?
KDC Hierarchies

- In hierarchy, what can each compromised KDC do?
- What would happen if root was compromised?
- If it’s not a name-based hierarchy, how do you find a path?

What should a ticket look like?

- Ticket cannot include server’s plaintext password
  - Otherwise, next time user will access server directly without proving his identity to authentication service
- Solution: encrypt some information with a key derived from the server’s password
  - Server can decrypt ticket and verify information
  - User does not learn server’s password
What should a ticket include?

- User name
- Server name
- Address of user’s workstation
  - Otherwise, a user on another workstation can steal the ticket and use it to gain access to the server
- Ticket lifetime
- A few other things (e.g., session key)

How is authentication done?

- **Insecure**: passwords are sent in plaintext
  - Eavesdropper can steal the password and later impersonate the user to the authentication server
- **Inconvenient**: need to send the password each time to obtain the ticket for any network service
  - Separate authentication for email, printing, etc.
Solution: Two-Step Authentication

- Prove identity **once** to obtain special **TGTicket**
  - Instead of password, use **key** derived from password
- Use **TGT** to get tickets for many network services

**Prove identity once** to obtain special **TGTicket**

- Instead of password, use **key** derived from password
- Use **TGT** to get tickets for many network services

Still Not Good Enough

- **Ticket hijacking**
  - Malicious user may steal the service ticket of another user on the same workstation and use it
    - IP address verification does not help
  - Servers must be able to verify that the user who is presenting the ticket is the same user to whom the ticket was issued

- No server authentication
  - Attacker may misconfigure the network so that he receives messages addressed to a legitimate server
    - Capture private information from users and/or deny service
  - Servers must prove their identity to users
Key management

❖ Where do keys come from?
  ❖ Symmetric Ciphers: Key Distribution Center (KDC)
  ❖ Why?
    • Shared key for any communication pair does not scale and is cryptographically unwise – uses each key too much!

❖ Key lifetime / freshness?
  ❖ Long-lived key for authentication and session key negotiation
  ❖ Short-lived key for transfer
  ❖ Why?
    • Long-lived keys are tempting/easy targets (stream ciphers!!!)
    • Compromised old keys

Needham-Schroeder Protocol (1978)

❖ Basis of Kerberos
❖ Relies on a key distribution centre (KDC)
❖ KDC is part of the trusted computing base
  ❖ Knows secret keys of all participants
  ❖ Manages $N$ keys (instead of $\mathcal{O}(N-1)/2$)
❖ Solves two key problems
  ❖ Distribution of shared secret key
  ❖ Mutual authentication
Needham and Schroeder’s Protocol

1. A wants to talk to B; sends info + nonce/ID: A, B, ID1

2. Ack of message ID; new key for A ↔ B: K(A,B); ticket for B; encrypted with secret key of A: [ID1, B, K(A,B), ticket]K(A)

3. A decrypts & sends ticket to B: ticket


Alice proves that she can read nonce

Cryptographic protocol design is hard

- Bob never proved his identity to Alice
- If K(A,B) is compromised attacker can impersonate Alice forever
- Denning and Sacco proposed a fix in 1981
- Needham found a flaw in their fix in 1994
- Another flaw found in public key version in 1995 (it is actually only a 3-message protocol)

- Cryptographic protocol design is hard!!!
Kerberos [RFC4120, NeumanTs‘94]

- Kerberos: ("der Höllenhund") The watch dog of Hades, whose duty it was to guard the entrance – against whom or what does not clearly appear; ... it is known to have had three heads...
  - Ambrose Bierce, The Enlarged Devil’s Dictionary

- Designed to authenticate users to servers
- Users use their password to authenticate themselves
- It is possible to protect the Kerberos server
- Assumption: The workstations have not been tampered with!

Kerberos lingua

- Principles: Kerberos entity
  - User or system service
  - Triples: (primary name, instance, realm)
    Realm: identifies Kerberos server
  - Examples:
    username@some.domain.name
    somehost/lpr@other.domaim

- Tickets: cryptographically sealed messages with session keys and identifiers
  - Used to obtain a service
- Ticket-Granting ticket (TGT)
  - Ticket to obtain other tickets
How Kerberos works

- Relies on
  - Kerberos key distribution center (KDC)
  - Ticket granting service (TGS)

- Users
  - Have to present a ticket to obtain a service
  - Request TGT from KDC via extended Needham-Schroeder (using their shared secret with the KDC)
  - Request tickets from TGS via extended Needham-Schroeder (using the TGT)
Symmetric keys in Kerberos

- $K_C$ is long-term key for each client $C$
  - Derived from user’s password
  - Known to client and key distribution center (KDC)
- $K_{TGS}$ is long-term key of TGS
  - Known to KDC and ticket granting service (TGS)
- $K_V$ is long-term key of each service $V$
  - Known to $V$ and TGS; separate key for each service
- $K_{C,TGS}$ is short-term key between $C$ and TGS
  - Created by KDC, known to $C$ and TGS
- $K_{C,V}$ is short-term key between $C$ and $V$
  - Created by TGS, known to $C$ and $V$

“Single logon” authentication

- Client only needs to obtain TGTicket once (say, every morning)
  - Ticket is encrypted; client cannot forge it or tamper with it
**Obtaining a service ticket**

- Client uses TGTicket to obtain a service ticket and a short-term key for each network service
  - One encrypted, unforgeable ticket per service (printer, email, etc.)

**Obtaining service**

- For each service request, client uses the short-term key for that service and the ticket he received from TGS
Kerberos in large networks

- One KDC isn’t enough for large networks (why?)
- Network is divided into **realms**
  - KDCs in different realms have different key databases
- To access a service in another realm, users must...
  - Get ticket for home-realm TGS from home-realm KDC
  - Get ticket for remote-realm TGS from home-realm TGS
    - As if remote-realm TGS were just another network service
  - Get ticket for remote service from that realm’s TGS
  - Use remote-realm ticket to access service
  - \(M(M-1)/2\) key exchanges for full \(M\)-realm interoperation

Summary of Kerberos
**Important ideas in Kerberos**

- Use of short-term session keys
  - Minimize distribution and use of long-term secrets; only used to derive short-term session keys
  - Separate short-term key for each user-server pair
    - But multiple user-server sessions reuse the same key!

- Proofs of identity are based on authenticators
  - Client encrypts his identity, address and current time using short-term session key
    - Also prevents replays (if clocks are globally synchronized)
  - Server learns this key separately (via encrypted ticket that client cannot decrypt) and verifies user’s identity

- Symmetric cryptography only

**Problematic issues**

- Password dictionary attacks on client master keys
- Ticket cache security
- Subverted login command
- Replay of authenticators
  - 5-minute lifetimes long enough for replay
  - Timestamps assume global, secure synchronized clocks
  - Challenge-response would be better
- Same user-server key used for all sessions
- Homebrewed PCBC mode of encryption
  - Tries to combine integrity check with encryption
- Extraneous double encryption of tickets
- No ticket delegation
  - Printer cannot fetch email from server on your behalf
Kerberos Version 5

- Better user-server authentication
  - Separate subkey for each user-server session instead of re-using the session key contained in ticket
  - Authentication via subkeys, not timestamp increments
- Authentication forwarding
  - Servers can access other servers on user’s behalf
- Realm hierarchies for inter-realm authentication
- Richer ticket functionality
- Explicit integrity checking + standard CBC mode
- Multiple encryption schemes, not just DES

Practical Uses of Kerberos

- Email, FTP, network file systems and many other applications have been kerberized
  - Use of Kerberos is transparent for the end user
  - Transparency is important for usability!
- Standard authentication for Windows (since W2K)
- Local authentication
  - login and su in OpenBSD
- Authentication for network protocols
  - rlogin, rsh, telnet, afs
- Secure windowing systems
  - xdm, kx
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

- Widely deployed
  - Supported by almost all Web browsers and servers
  - \textbf{https}
  - Lots \$ spent over SSL
- Originally designed by Netscape in 1993
- Proposed standard:
  - TLS: transport layer security (RFC 4346)
- Provides
  - Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Authentication

Original goals:
- Secure Web e-commerce transactions
- Encryption (especially credit-card numbers)
- Web-server authentication
- Optional client authentication
- Minimum hassle for business with new merchant

Available to all TCP applications
- Secure socket interface

SSL and TCP/IP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normal Application</th>
<th>Application with SSL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>SSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- Many SSL libraries/classes readily available, including C, C++, Java, Perl, ...
Could do something like PGP

But want to send byte streams & interactive data
Want a set of secret keys for entire connection
Want certificate exchange as part of protocol: handshake phase

Toy SSL: a simple secure channel

Handshake: Alice and Bob use their certificates and private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret
Key Derivation: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
Data Transfer: Data to be transferred is broken up into a series of records
Connection Closure: Special messages to securely close connection
**Toy: simple handshake**

- $K_s(MS) = EMS$
- MS = master secret
- EMS = encrypted master secret

---

**Toy: key derivation**

- Bad to use same key for >1 cryptographic op.
  - Different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
- Four keys:
  - $K_c = $ encryption key for data sent from client to server
  - $M_c = $ MAC key for data sent from client to server
  - $E_s = $ encryption key for data sent from server to client
  - $M_s = $ MAC key for data sent from server to client
- Keys derived via key derivation function (KDF)
  - Takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data and creates the keys
Recall MAC

Recall that HMAC is a standardized MAC algorithm
SSL uses a variation of HMAC
TLS uses HMAC

Toy: data records

Why not encrypt data in stream as we write it to TCP?
  ♦ Where to put MAC?
    At end? No message integrity until all data processed.
    E.g.: instant messaging: how to do integrity check over all bytes before displaying?
  ♦ Break stream in series of records
    ♦ Each record carries a MAC
    ♦ Receiver can act on each record as it arrives
  ♦ Issue for receiver: how to distinguish MAC from data
    ♦ Want to use variable-length records

| length | data | MAC |
Toy: sequence numbers

- Attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records
- Solution: put sequence number into MAC:
  - MAC = MAC(M_x, sequence||data)
  - Sequence number serves as nonce for record
  - Note: no sequence number field
- Attacker could still replay all of the records
  - Use session nonce as well

Toy: control information

- Truncation attack:
  - Attacker forges TCP connection close segment
  - One or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is.
- Solution: record types, with special type for closure
  - Type 0 for data; type 1 for closure
- MAC = MAC(M_x, sequence||type||data)
Toy SSL: summary

- hello
- certificate, nonce
- $K^c_{s}(MS) = EMS$
- type 0, seq 1, data
- type 0, seq 2, data
- type 0, seq 1, data
- type 0, seq 3, data
- type 1, seq 4, close
- type 1, seq 2, close

encrypted

bob.com

Toy SSL is not complete

- How long are the fields?
- What encryption protocols?
- No negotiation
  - Allow support for different encryption algorithms
  - Allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer
Most common symmetric ciphers in SSL

- DES – Data Encryption Standard: block
- 3DES – Triple strength: block
- RC2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block
- RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4: stream

Public key encryption
- RSA

SSL cipher suite

- Cipher suite
  - Public-key algorithm
  - Symmetric encryption algorithm
  - MAC algorithm
- SSL supports a variety of cipher suites
- Negotiation:
  - Client offers choice; server picks one
Real SSL: handshake (1)

**Purpose**
1. Server authentication
2. Negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms
3. Establish keys
4. Client authentication (optional)

Real SSL: handshake (2)

1. **Client** sends list of algorithms, along with client nonce
2. **Server** chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce
3. **Client** verifies certificate,
   extracts server’s public key,
   generates pre_master_secret,
   encrypts with server’s public key,
   sends to server
4. **Client** and **server** independently compute encryption and MAC keys from pre_master_secret and nonces
5. **Client** sends MAC of all handshake messages
6. **Server** sends MAC of all handshake messages
Real SSL: handshaking (3)

Last 2 steps protect against tampering of handshake
- Client typically offers range of algorithms: some strong, some weak
- Man-in-the middle can delete stronger algorithms
- Last 2 steps prevent this
  - Note: last two messages are encrypted!

Handshake types

- All handshake messages (with SSL header) have 1 byte type field: Types
  - ClientHello
  - ServerHello
  - Certificate
  - ServerKeyExchange
  - CertificateRequest
  - ServerHelloDone
  - CertificateVerify
  - ClientKeyExchange
  - Finished
SSL record protocol

Record header: content type; version; length
MAC: includes sequence number, MAC key $M_x$
Fragment: each SSL fragment $2^{14}$ bytes (~16 Kbytes)

SSL record format

Data and MAC encrypted (symmetric key algorithm)
### Content types in record header

- **Application_data**
- **Alert**
  - Signaling errors during handshake
- **Handshake**
  - Initial handshake messages are carried in records of type "handshake"
  - Handshake messages in turn have their own types
- **Change_cipher_spec**
  - Indicates change in encryption and authentication algorithms

### SSL: real connection

- handshake: ClientHello
- handshake: ServerHello
- handshake: Certificate
- handshake: ServerHelloDone
- handshake: ClientKeyExchange
- ChangeCipherSpec
- handshake: Finished
- ChangeCipherSpec
- handshake: Finished
- application_data
- application_data
- Alert: warning, close_notify

Everything henceforth is encrypted

TCP Fin follows
Comments about trace messages

**ClientHello**
- Random: 32-byte nonce

**ServerHello**
- Cipher suite: RSA key exchange, DES-CBC message encryption, SHA digest
- Random: 32-byte nonce
- Session_id: used for session resumption

**Certificate**
- X.509 format
- Subject: company info
- Issuer: CA
- Certificate = public key

**ClientKeyExchange**
- Includes encrypted PreMasterSecret

**Finished**
- MAC of concatenation of handshake messages

---

Key derivation

- Client random, server random, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number generator.
  - Produces master secret
- Master secret, client and server random numbers into another random-number generator
  - Produces “key block”
- Key block sliced and diced:
  - Client MAC key
  - Server MAC key
  - Client encryption key
  - Server encryption key
  - Client initialization vector (IV)
  - Server initialization vector (IV)
SSL performance

- Recall: big-number operations in public-key crypto are CPU intensive
- Server handshake
  - Typically over half SSL handshake CPU time goes to RSA decryption of the encrypted pre_master_secret
- Client handshake
  - Public key encryption is less expensive
  - Server is handshake bottleneck
- Data transfer
  - Symmetric encryption
  - MAC calculation
  - Neither is as CPU intensive as public-key decryption

Session resumption

- Full handshake is expensive: CPU time
- If the client and server have already communicated once, they can skip handshake and proceed directly to data transfer
  - Session caching
  - For a given session, client and server store session_id, master_secret, negotiated ciphers
- Client sends session_id in ClientHello
- Server then agrees to resume in ServerHello
  - New key_block computed from master_secret and client and server random numbers
Client authentication

- SSL can also authenticate client
- Server sends a CertificateRequest message to client

Who issues Web certificates?

- Browser comes with list of built-in certificate authorities
- Firefox: 138(?) certificate authorities!
- Do you trust them all to be honest and competent?
- Do you even know them?

E.g.: Baltimore Cybertrust
- Sold its PKI in 2003
- What about the new owners?
Mountain America Credit Union

- Reputable CA issued certificate for Mountain America
- DNS name: www.mountain-america.net
- Looks OK
- But „real“ site at www.mtnamerica.org

- Which site is intended by the user?

Technical attack

- Scenario:
  - Usually: shopping via unencrypted pages
  - Click on „Checkout“ (or „Login“ on bank Web site)
  - Next page – downloaded without SSL protection – has login link, which uses SSL

- Attack:
  - Tamper with that page
  - Will anyone notice
  - Note some sites outsource payment processing!

- SUGGESTION:
  - Attend our WEB browser security seminar starting this Friday!
SUGGESTION:

- Attend our WEB Browser Security seminar starting this Friday!

SSL summary

- Cryptography itself seems correct
  - Indeed is formally verified after many iterations
- Human factors are dubious
- Most users don't know what a certificate is, or how to verify one
  - Moreover: hard to know what it should say!
- No rational basis for deciding whether or not to trust a CA