

Crypto Basics

Cryptography Overview
Public vs. Private Key Cryptography
Classical / ancient ciphers
Modern ciphers: DES
Modes of operation
Stream cipher: RC4

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What is a cryptosystem?

- $K = \{0,1\}^l$
- $P = \{0,1\}^m$
- $C' = \{0,1\}^n, C \subseteq C'$

- $E: P \times K \rightarrow C$
- $D: C \times K \rightarrow P$

- $\forall p \in P, k \in K: D(E(p,k),k) = p$
 - It is *infeasible* to find inversion $F: P \times C \rightarrow K$

Lets start again!
This time in English


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What is a cryptosystem?

- A pair of algorithms that take a **key** and convert **plaintexts** to **ciphertexts** and backwards later
 - **Plaintext**: text to be protected
 - **Ciphertext**: should appear like random
- Requires sophisticated math!
 - Do not try to design your own algorithms!

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The language of cryptography



- **Symmetric or secret key crypto**: sender and receiver keys are identical and ***secret***
- **Asymmetric or Public-key crypto**: encrypt key public, decrypt key secret

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Attacks

- ❑ Opponent whose goal is to break a cryptosystem is the *adversary*
 - Assume adversary knows algorithm used, but not key

- ❑ Three types of attacks:
 - *ciphertext only*:
 - adversary has only ciphertext; goal is to find plaintext, possibly key
 - *known plaintext*:
 - adversary has ciphertext, corresponding plaintext; goal is to find key
 - *chosen plaintext*:
 - adversary may supply plaintexts and obtain corresponding ciphertext; goal is to find key

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Basis for Attacks

- ❑ Mathematical attacks
 - Based on analysis of underlying mathematics

- ❑ Statistical attacks
 - Make assumptions about the distribution of letters, pairs of letters (digrams), triplets of letters (trigrams), *etc.*
 - Called *models of the language*

 - Examine ciphertext, correlate properties with the assumptions.

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Example: Symmetric key cryptography

Substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- Monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
 ↓ ↓ ↓
ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice
 ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

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Monoalphabetic Cipher Security

- Total of $26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$ keys
- So many keys, might think is secure
- **!!!WRONG!!!**
- Problem is language characteristics


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Language Redundancy and Cryptanalysis

- Human languages are **redundant**
- Eg "th lrd s m shphrd shll nt wnt"
- Letters are not equally commonly used
- In English E is by far the most common letter
 - followed by T,R,N,I,O,A,S
- Other letters like Z,J,K,Q,X are fairly rare
- Have tables of single, double & triple letter frequencies for various languages

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English Letter Frequencies



Use in Cryptanalysis

- ❑ Key concept
 - monoalphabetic substitution ciphers do not change relative letter frequencies
- ❑ Discovered by Arabian scientists in 9th century
- ❑ Calculate letter frequencies for ciphertext
- ❑ Compare counts/plots against known values
- ❑ For monoalphabetic must identify each letter
 - tables of common double/triple letters help

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Properties of a good cryptosystem

- ❑ There should be no way short of enumerating all possible keys to find the key from any reasonable amount of ciphertext and/or plaintext, nor any way to produce plaintext from ciphertext without the key
- ❑ Enumerating all possible keys must be infeasible
- ❑ The ciphertext must be indistinguishable from true random values

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Milestones in modern cryptography

- ❑ 1883 Kerckhoffs' principles
- ❑ 1917–1918 Vernam/Mauborgne cipher (one-time pad)
- ❑ 1920s–1940s Mathematicization and mechanization of cryptography and cryptanalysis
- ❑ 1973 U.S. National Bureau of Standards issues a public call for a standard cipher; this led to the adoption of the Data encryption Standard (DES)₁₃

Milestones in modern cryptography: Public key cryptography

- ❑ Merkle invents a public key distribution scheme
- ❑ 1976: Diffie and Hellman invent public key encryption and digital signatures, but do not devise a suitable algorithms with all desired properties
- ❑ 1977: Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman invent their algorithm RSA soon after
- ❑ 1973: Clifford Cocks, a British mathematician working for the UK intelligence agency GCHQ, described an equivalent system in an internal document in 1973.
 - His discovery, however, was not revealed until 1997 due to its top-secret classification, and Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman devised RSA independently of Cocks' work.

Kerckhoffs' law

- „The system must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience“
- In other words, the security of the system must rest entirely on the secrecy of the key not the algorithm itself

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Vernam/Mauborgne cipher

- **Exclusive-OR** a key stream tape with the plaintext
- Online encryption of teletype traffic, combined with transmission
- For a **one-time pad** – which is provably secure – use true-random keying tapes and never reuse the keying material
- Problem: **how to get good long one-time pads**
 - Reuse of keying material \Rightarrow stream cipher
 - Key stream via algorithm \Rightarrow no one-time pad

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Mathematicization and mechanization

- ❑ Mechanical encryptors
(Vernam, Enigma, Hagelin, Scherbius)
- ❑ Mathematical cryptanalysis
(Friedman, Rejewski et al., Bletchley Park)
- ❑ Machine-aided cryptanalysis
(Friedman, Turing et al.)

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Hagelin Rotor Machine



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Standardized ciphers

- ❑ Until the 1970s, most strong ciphers were government secrets
- ❑ Spread of computers ⇒ new threads
(Reportedly, soviets eavesdropped on U.S. grain negotiators' conversations)
- ❑ NBS (now called NIST) issued public call for cipher; eventually IBM responded

⇒ eventual result – via secret process – DES

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What we have today

- ❑ Encryption is completely computerized and operates on bits
- ❑ Basic primitives can be combined to produce powerful results
 - Difficult to verify combined result.
- ❑ Encryption is by far the strongest weapon of computer security
- ❑ Host and OS software is by far the weakest link
- ❑ **Bad software breaks crypto – NEVER the cryptanalysis.**

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Modern Block Ciphers

- ❑ Look at modern block ciphers
- ❑ One of the most widely used types of cryptographic algorithms
- ❑ Provides secrecy / authentication services
- ❑ Focus now on DES (Data Encryption Standard)
- ❑ Illustrate block cipher design principles

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Block vs. Stream Ciphers

- ❑ block ciphers process messages in blocks, each of which is then en/decrypted
- ❑ like a substitution on very big characters
 - 64-bits or more
- ❑ stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time when en/decrypting
- ❑ many current ciphers are block ciphers
- ❑ broader range of applications


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Block Cipher Principles

- ❑ most symmetric block ciphers are based on a so called
 - **Feistel Cipher Structure**
- ❑ needed since must be able to **decrypt** ciphertext to recover messages efficiently
- ❑ block ciphers look like an extremely large substitution
- ❑ would need table of 2^{64} entries for a 64-bit block
- ❑ instead create from smaller building blocks
- ❑ using idea of a product cipher

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Ideal Block Cipher



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Claude Shannon and Substitution-Permutation Ciphers

- ❑ Claude Shannon introduced idea of substitution-permutation (S-P) networks in 1949 paper
- ❑ form basis of modern block ciphers
- ❑ S-P nets are based on the two primitive cryptographic operations seen before:
 - *substitution* (S-box)
 - *permutation* (P-box)
- ❑ provide *confusion* & *diffusion* of message & key₂₅

Confusion and Diffusion

- ❑ cipher needs to completely obscure statistical properties of original message
- ❑ a one-time pad does this
- ❑ more practically Shannon suggested combining S & P elements to obtain:
 - **diffusion** – dissipates statistical structure of plaintext over bulk of ciphertext
 - **confusion** – makes relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible

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Feistel Cipher Structure


- ❑ Horst Feistel devised the **feistel cipher**
 - based on concept of invertible product cipher

- ❑ partitions input block into two halves
 - process through multiple rounds which
 - perform a substitution on left data half
 - based on round function of right half & subkey
 - then have permutation swapping halves

- ❑ implements Shannon's S-P net concept

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Feistel Cipher Structure




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Feistel Cipher Design Elements

- ❑ block size
- ❑ key size
- ❑ number of rounds
- ❑ subkey generation algorithm
- ❑ round function
- ❑ fast software en/decryption
- ❑ ease of analysis

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Feistel Cipher Decryption



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Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- ❑ most widely used block cipher in world
- ❑ adopted in 1977 by NBS (now NIST)
 - as FIPS PUB 46
- ❑ encrypts 64-bit data using 56-bit key
- ❑ has widespread use
- ❑ has been considerable controversy over its security

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DES History

- ❑ IBM developed Lucifer cipher
 - by team led by Feistel in late 60's
 - used 64-bit data blocks with 128-bit key
- ❑ then redeveloped as a commercial cipher with input from NSA and others
- ❑ in 1973 NBS issued request for proposals for a national cipher standard
- ❑ IBM submitted their revised Lucifer which was eventually accepted as the DES


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DES Design Controversy

- although DES standard is public
- was considerable controversy over design
 - in choice of 56-bit key (vs Lucifer 128-bit)
 - and because design criteria were classified
- subsequent events and public analysis show in fact design was appropriate
- use of DES has flourished
 - especially in financial applications
 - still standardised for legacy application use

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DES Encryption Overview



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Initial Permutation IP

- ❑ first step of the data computation
- ❑ IP reorders the input data bits
- ❑ even bits to LH half, odd bits to RH half
- ❑ quite regular in structure (easy in h/w)

○ example:

`IP(675a6967 5e5a6b5a) = (ffb2194d 004df6fb)`


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DES Round Structure

- ❑ uses two 32-bit L & R halves
- ❑ as for any Feistel cipher can describe as:
$$L_i = R_{i-1}$$
$$R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i)$$
- ❑ F takes 32-bit R half and 48-bit subkey:
 - expands R to 48-bits using perm E
 - adds to subkey using XOR
 - passes through 8 S-boxes to get 32-bit result
 - finally permutes using 32-bit perm P

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DES Round Structure



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Substitution Boxes S

- have eight S-boxes which map 6 to 4 bits
- each S-box is actually 4 little 4 bit boxes
 - outer bits 1 & 6 (**row** bits) select one row of 4
 - inner bits 2-5 (**col** bits) are substituted
 - result is 8 lots of 4 bits, or 32 bits
- row selection depends on both data & key
 - feature known as autoclaving (autokeying)
- example:
 - $S(18\ 09\ 12\ 3d\ 11\ 17\ 38\ 39) = 5fd25e03$

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DES Key Schedule

- forms subkeys used in each round
 - initial permutation of the key (PC1) which selects 56-bits in two 28-bit halves
 - 16 stages consisting of:
 - rotating **each half** separately either 1 or 2 places depending on the **key rotation schedule K**
 - selecting 24-bits from each half & permuting them by PC2 for use in round function F

- note practical use issues in h/w vs. s/w

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DES Decryption

- decrypt must unwind steps of data computation

- with Feistel design, do encryption steps again using subkeys in reverse order (SK16 ... SK1)
 - IP undoes final FP step of encryption
 - 1st round with SK16 undoes 16th encrypt round
 -
 - 16th round with SK1 undoes 1st encrypt round
 - then final FP undoes initial encryption IP
 - thus recovering original data value

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Avalanche Effect

- ❑ key desirable property of encryption alg
- ❑ where a change of **one** input or key bit results in changing approx **half** output bits
- ❑ making attempts to “home-in” by guessing keys impossible
- ❑ DES exhibits strong avalanche

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Strength of DES – Key Size

- ❑ 56-bit keys have $2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$ values
- ❑ brute force search looks hard
- ❑ recent advances have shown is possible
 - in 1997 on Internet in a few months
 - in 1998 on dedicated h/w (EFF) in a few days
 - in 1999 above combined in 22hrs!
- ❑ still must be able to recognize plaintext
- ❑ must now consider alternatives to DES – **AES**

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Strength of DES – Analytic Attacks

- ❑ now have several analytic attacks on DES
- ❑ these utilise some deep structure of the cipher
 - by gathering information about encryptions
 - can eventually recover some/all of the sub-key bits
 - if necessary then exhaustively search for the rest
- ❑ generally these are statistical attacks
- ❑ include
 - differential cryptanalysis
 - linear cryptanalysis
 - related key attacks

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Differential Cryptanalysis

- ❑ one of the most significant recent (public) advances in cryptanalysis
- ❑ known by NSA in 70's of DES design
- ❑ Murphy, Biham & Shamir published in 90's
- ❑ powerful method to analyse block ciphers
- ❑ used to analyse most current block ciphers with varying degrees of success
- ❑ DES reasonably resistant to it, cf. Lucifer

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Differential Cryptanalysis

- a statistical attack against Feistel ciphers
- uses cipher structure not previously used
- design of S-P networks has output of function f influenced by both input & key
- hence cannot trace values back through cipher without knowing value of the key
- differential cryptanalysis compares two related pairs of encryptions

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Differential Cryptanalysis Compares Pairs of Encryptions

- with a known difference in the input
- searching for a known difference in output
- when same subkeys are used

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta m_{i+1} &= m_{i+1} \oplus m'_{i+1} \\ &= [m_{i-1} \oplus f(m_i, K_i)] \oplus [m'_{i-1} \oplus f(m'_i, K_i)] \\ &= \Delta m_{i-1} \oplus [f(m_i, K_i) \oplus f(m'_i, K_i)]\end{aligned}$$


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Differential Cryptanalysis

- have some input difference giving some output difference with probability p
- if find instances of some higher probability input / output difference pairs occurring
- can infer subkey that was used in round
- then must iterate process over many rounds (with decreasing probabilities)

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Differential Cryptanalysis



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Differential Cryptanalysis

- ❑ perform attack by repeatedly encrypting plaintext pairs with known input XOR until obtain desired output XOR
- ❑ when found
 - if intermediate rounds match required XOR have a **right pair**
 - if not then have a **wrong pair**
- ❑ can then deduce keys values for the rounds
 - right pairs suggest same key bits
 - wrong pairs give random values
- ❑ for large numbers of rounds, probability is so low that more pairs are required than exist with 64-bit inputs
- ❑ Biham and Shamir have shown how a 13-round iterated characteristic can break the full 16-round DES

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Linear Cryptanalysis

- ❑ another recent development
- ❑ also a statistical method
- ❑ must be iterated over rounds, with decreasing probabilities
- ❑ developed by Matsui et al in early 90's
- ❑ based on finding linear approximations
- ❑ can attack DES with 2^{43} known plaintexts, easier but still in practise infeasible

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Linear Cryptanalysis

- ❑ find linear approximations with prob $p \neq 1/2$
 $P[i_1, i_2, \dots, i_a] \oplus C[j_1, j_2, \dots, j_b] = K[k_1, k_2, \dots, k_c]$
where i_a, j_b, k_c are bit locations in P, C, K
- ❑ gives linear equation for key bits
- ❑ get one key bit using max likelihood alg
- ❑ using a large number of trial encryptions
- ❑ effectiveness given by: $|p - 1/2|$

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DES Design Criteria

- ❑ as reported by Coppersmith in [COPP94]
- ❑ 7 criteria for S-boxes provide for
 - non-linearity
 - resistance to differential cryptanalysis
 - good confusion
- ❑ 3 criteria for permutation P provide for
 - increased diffusion

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Block Cipher Design

- ❑ basic principles still like Feistel's in 1970's
- ❑ number of rounds
 - more is better, exhaustive search best attack
- ❑ function f:
 - provides "confusion", is nonlinear, avalanche
 - have issues of how S-boxes are selected
- ❑ key schedule
 - complex subkey creation, key avalanche

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How to use a block cipher

- ❑ Direct use of a block cipher is inadvisable
 - Enemy can build up „code book“ of plaintext/ciphertext equivalents
 - Only works for messages that are a multiple of the block size
- ❑ Solution: 5 standard modes of operation
 - Electronic Code Book (ECB)
 - Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
 - Cipher Feedback (CFB)
 - Output Feedback (OFB)
 - Counter (CTR)

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Codes vs. Ciphers

- ❑ Ciphers operate **syntactically**, on elements of an alphabet (letters) or groups of "letters":
A → D, B → C, etc.
- ❑ Codes operate **semantically**, on words, phrases, or sentences, e.g., per codebooks

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
Electronic Code Book

- ❑ Direct use of block cipher
- ❑ Used primarily to transmit encrypted keys
- ❑ Very weak for general-purpose encryption
- ❑ Problem: block substitution attack

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Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- IV: Initialization vector, P: plaintext, C: ciphertext



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
Cipher Block Chaining

- Properties of CBC
 - Ciphertext of each encrypted block depends on the plaintext of all preceding blocks
 - Subsets of blocks appear valid and will decrypt properly
 - Message integrity has to be done otherwise
- CBC and electronic voting
[Kohno,Stubblefield,Rubin,Wallach]
 - Found in the source code for Diebold voting machines:
 - `DesCBCEncrypt ((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data, totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT)`

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ECB vs. CBC


[Picture due to Bart Preneel]



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Information leakage in ECB mode


[Wikipedia]



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n-Bit Cipher Feedback


- ❑ Add n-bit shift and move Encrypt operation before X-OR operator
- ❑ Retains some of the previous cycle's ciphertext
- ❑ Copes gracefully with deletion of n-bit unit (bit errors)



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n-Bit Output Feedback


- ❑ No error propagation
- ❑ Active attacker can make controlled changes to plaintext
- ❑ OFB is a form of stream cipher



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Counter mode

- ❑ Another form of stream cipher
- ❑ Counter often split in message and block number
- ❑ Active attack can make controlled changes to plaintext
- ❑ Highly parallelizable
- ❑ No linkage between stages
- ❑ Vital: Counter never to repeat



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Which mode for what task

- ❑ General file or packet encryption: CBC
 - ⇒ Input must be padded to $n \times$ cipher block size
- ❑ Risk of byte or bit deletion: CFB₈ or CFB₁
- ❑ Bit stream: noisy line and error propagation is undesirable: OFB
- ❑ Very high-speed data: CTR
- ❑ Needed in most situations: integrity checks
 - Actually needed almost always
 - Attack on integrity ⇒ attack on confidentiality
 - Solution: separate integrity check along with encryption

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Stream ciphers

❑ Operation:

- Key stream generator produces a sequence S of pseudo-random bytes
- Key stream bytes are combined (usually via XOR) with plaintext bytes

❑ Properties:


- Very good for asynchronous traffic
- Best-known stream cipher RC4 (used, e.g., in SSL)
- Key stream must never be reused for different plaintexts

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RC4

- ❑ Extremely efficient
- ❑ After key setup, it just produces a key stream
- ❑ Internal state: 256-byte array plus two integers

For as many iterations as are needed, the RC4 modifies the state and outputs a byte of the keystream. In each iteration, it increments i , adds the value of S pointed to by i to j , exchanges the values of $S[i]$ and $S[j]$, and then outputs the value of S at the location $S[i] + S[j]$ (modulo 256). Each value of S is swapped at least once every 256 iterations.



- ❑ No resynchronization except via rekeying + starting over
- ❑ Note:
known weaknesses if used other than as stream cipher

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CPU speed vs. key size

- ❑ Adding one bit to the key doubles work for brute force attack
- ❑ Effect on encryption time is often negligible or even free
- ❑ It costs nothing to use a longer RC4 key
- ❑ Going from 128-bit AES to 256-bit AES takes (at most) 40% longer for en-/decryption but increases the attacker's effort by a factor of 2^{128}
- ❑ Using triple DES costs $3\times$ more to encrypt, but increases the attacker's effort by a factor of 2^{112}
- ❑ Moore's Law favors the defender!

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Summary

- ❑ Have considered:
 - Block vs. stream ciphers
 - Feistel cipher design & structure
 - DES
 - details
 - strength
 - Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis
 - Block cipher design principles
 - Use of a block cipher: Modes of operation

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