

The Threats of Internet Worms


Based on
Addressing the Threat of Internet Worms
Vern Paxson UCB/ICSI

UCLA Jon Postel Distinguished Lecturer Series, 2005

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Internet Abuse

USENET Bulletin Board Traffic Volume



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What is a Worm?

- A worm is self-replicating software designed to spread through the network
 - Typically exploits security flaws in widely used services
 - Spreads across a network by exploiting flaws in open services.
 - Can cause enormous damage
 - Launch DDOS attacks, install Botnets
 - Access sensitive information
 - Cause confusion by corrupting the sensitive information
- Worm vs. Virus vs. Trojan horse
 - A virus is code embedded in a file or program
 - Viruses and Trojan horses rely on human intervention
 - Worms are self-contained

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
What is a Worm? (2.)

- Not new — Morris Worm, Nov. 1988
 - 6-10% of all Internet hosts infected
 - Infects DEC VAX and Sun machines running BSD UNIX connected to the Internet, and becomes the first worm to spread extensively "in the wild", and one of the first well-known programs exploiting buffer overrun vulnerabilities
- Many more since, but for 13 years none on that scale, until ...

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Impact of worms on scanning


Scan Activity Seen At LBL



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Impact of worms on scanning

Scan Activity Seen At LBL



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
Code Red, con't

- Revision released July 19, 2001.
- White House responds to threat of flooding attack by changing the address of `www.whitehouse.gov`
- Causes Code Red to die for date \geq 20th of the month.

- But: This time random number generator correctly seeded. Bingo!


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Measuring activity: Network telescope



- Monitor cross-section of Internet address space, measure traffic
 - “Backscatter” from DOS floods
 - Attackers probing blindly
 - Random scanning from worms
- LBNL’s cross-section: 1/32,768 of Internet
- UCSD, UWisc’s cross-section: 1/256.

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Measuring Internet-Scale Activity: Network Telescopes


- Idea: Monitor a cross-section of Internet address space to measure network traffic involving wide range of addresses
 - "Backscatter" from DOS floods
 - Attackers probing blindly
 - Random scanning from worms

Spread of Code Red

- Network telescopes estimate of # infected hosts: 360K.
- Note: The larger the vulnerable population, the faster the worm spreads.
- That night (\Rightarrow 20th), worm dies ...
... except for hosts with inaccurate clocks!
- It just takes one of these to restart the worm on August 1st ...

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Return of Code Red Worm



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Striving for Greater Virulence: Code Red 2

- ❑ Released August 4, 2001.
- ❑ Comment in code: "Code Red 2."
 - But in fact completely different code base.
- ❑ Payload: A root backdoor, resilient to reboots.
- ❑ Bug: Crashes NT, only works on Windows 2000.

- ❑ Kills Code Red 1.



- ❑ Safety valve: Programmed to die Oct 1, 2001.

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
Striving for Greater Virulence: Nimda

- ❑ Released September 18, 2001.
- ❑ Multi-mode spreading:
 - Attack IIS servers via infected clients
 - Email itself to address book as a virus
 - Copy itself across open network shares
 - Modifying Web pages on infected servers w/ client exploit
 - Scanning for Code Red II backdoors (!)
- ❑ Worms form an ecosystem!
- ❑ Leaped across firewalls.

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


Life Just Before Slammer



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Life Just After Slammer



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A Lesson in Economy


- ❑ Slammer exploited a **connectionless UDP** service, rather than connection-oriented TCP.
- ❑ Entire worm fit in a single packet!
- ❑ When scanning, worm could **"fire and forget"**.

- ❑ Worm infected 75,000+ hosts in **10 minutes** (despite broken random number generator).
 - At its peak, **doubled** every **8.5 seconds**
- ❑ Progress limited by the Internet's bandwidth capacity!

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Slammer's Bandwidth-Limited Growth

DShield Probe Data



— DShield Data — $K=6.7/m$, $T=1808.7s$, $Peak=2050$, $Const. 28$

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Blaster

- ❑ Released August 11, 2003.
- ❑ Exploits flaw in RPC service ubiquitous across Windows.
- ❑ Payload: Attack Microsoft Windows Update.
- ❑ Despite flawed scanning and secondary infection strategy, rapidly propagates to (at least) 100K's of hosts.
- ❑ Actually, bulk of infections are really Nachia, a Blaster counter-worm.
- ❑ Key paradigm shift: Firewalls don't help.

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Cost of worms

- ❑ Morris worm, 1988
 - Infected approximately 6,000 machines
 - 10% of computers connected to the Internet
 - Cost ~ \$10 million in downtime and cleanup
- ❑ Code Red worm, July 16 2001
 - Direct descendant of Morris' worm
 - Infected more than 500,000 servers
 - Programmed to go into infinite sleep mode July 28
 - Caused ~ \$2.6 Billion in damages,
- ❑ Love Bug worm: \$8.75 billion

Statistics: Computer Economics Inc., Carlsbad, California

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Cost of worms (2.)

Financial Impact of Virus Attacks 1995—2005

Worldwide Impact (US \$)

2005	\$14.2 Billion
2004	17.5 Billion
2003	13.0 Billion
2002	11.1 Billion
2001	13.2 Billion
2000	17.1 Billion
1999	13.0 Billion
1998	6.1 Billion
1997	3.3 Billion
1996	1.8 Billion
1995	500 Million

Source: Computer Economics, 2006 Figure 1

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What if Spreading were Well-Designed?

- ❑ Observation:
 - Much of a worm's scanning is redundant.**
- ❑ Ideas:
 - Accelerate later phase: Coordinated scanning
 - Accelerate initial phase: Use precomputed hit-list
- ❑ **Greatly accelerates worm.**

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How do worms propagate?

- ❑ Scanning worms
 - Worm chooses "random" address
- ❑ Coordinated scanning
 - Different worm instances scan different addresses
- ❑ Flash worms
 - Preassemble tree of vulnerable hosts, propagate along tree
 - Not observed in the wild, yet
 - Potential for 10⁶ hosts in < 2 sec ! [Staniford]
- ❑ Meta-server worm
 - Contact server for hosts list (e.g., Google for "powered by phpbb")
- ❑ Topological worm
 - Use information from infected hosts (web server logs, email address books, config files, SSH "known hosts")
- ❑ Contagion worm
 - Propagate parasitically along with normal communication


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Defenses

- ❑ Detect via **honeyfarms**: Collections of "honeypots" fed by a network telescope.
 - Any outbound connection from honeyfarm = worm.
 - Distill signature from inbound/outbound traffic.
- ❑ Thwart via scan suppressors: Network elements that block traffic from hosts that make failed connection attempts to too many other hosts.
 - 5 minutes to several weeks to write a signature
 - Several hours or more for testing

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
Early Warning: Blaster Worm



Slide: Carey Nachenberg, Symantec ²⁹

Need for automation

- Current threats can spread faster than defenses can reaction
- Manual capture/analyze/signature/rollout model too slow



Slide: Carey Nachenberg, Symantec ³⁰

Defenses?

- Observation:
Worms don't need to randomly scan
- Meta-server worm: Ask server for hosts to infect (e.g., Google for "powered by phpbb")
- Topological worm: Fuel the spread with local information from infected hosts (web server logs, email address books, config files, SSH "known hosts")
- No scanning signature; With rich inter-connection topology, potentially very fast.

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Defenses??

- Contagion worm: Propagate parasitically along with normally initiated communication.
- E.g., using 2 exploits – Web browser & Web server – infect any vulnerable servers visited by browser, then any vulnerable browsers that come to those servers.
- E.g., using 1 BitTorrent exploit, glide along immense peer-to-peer network in days/hours.
- No unusual connection activity at all! :-)

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Some Cheery Thoughts

(Stefan Savage, UCSD/CCIED)

- Imagine the following species:
 - Poor genetic diversity; heavily inbred
 - Lives in “hot zone”; thriving ecosystem of infectious pathogens
 - Instantaneous transmission of disease
 - Immune response 10–1M times slower
 - Poor hygiene practices
- What would its long-term prognosis be?
- What if diseases were designed ...
 - Trivial to create a new disease
 - Highly profitable to do so

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Broader View of Defenses

- Prevention – make the monoculture harder
 - Get the darn code right in the first place ...
 - ... or figure out what’s wrong with it and fix it
 - Lots of active research (static & dynamic methods)
 - Security reviews now taken seriously by industry
 - E.g., ~\$200M just to review Windows Server 2003
 - But very expensive
 - And very large Installed Base problem
- Prevention – diversify the monoculture
 - Via exploiting existing heterogeneity
 - Via creating artificial heterogeneity

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Broader View of Defenses, con't

- Prevention – keep vulnerabilities inaccessible
 - Cisco's Network Admission Control
 - Frisk hosts that try to connect, block if vulnerable
 - Microsoft's Shield ("Band-Aid")
 - Shim-layer blocks network traffic that fits known vulnerability (rather than known exploit)
- Detection – look for unusual repeated content
 - Can work on non-scanning worms
 - Key off many-to-many communication to avoid confusion w/ non-worm sources
 - EarlyBird, Autograph – distill signature
 - But: What about polymorphic worms?

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Once You Have A Live Worm, Then What?

- Containment
 - Use distilled signature to prevent further spread
- Would like to leverage detections by others
 - But how can you trust these?
 - What if it's an attacker lying to you to provoke a self-damaging response? (Or to hide a later actual attack)

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Once You Have A Live Worm, Then What?, con't

- Proof of infection
 - Idea: Alerts come with a verifiable audit trail that demonstrates the exploit, ala' proof-carrying code
- Auto-patching
 - Techniques to derive (and test!) patches to fix vulnerabilities in real-time
 - (Excerpt from a review: "Not as crazy as it sounds")
- Auto-antiworm
 - Techniques to automatically derive a new worm from a propagating one, but with disinfectant payload
 - (This one, on the other hand, is as crazy as it sounds)

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Incidental Damage ... Today

- Today's worms have significant real-world impact:
 - Code Red disrupted routing
 - Slammer disrupted elections, ATMs, airline schedules, operations at an off-line nuclear power plant ...
 - Blaster possibly contributed to Great Blackout of Aug. 2003 ... ?
 - Plus major clean-up costs
- But today's worms are amateurish
 - Unimaginative payloads

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Where are the Nastier Worms??

- ❑ Botched propagation the norm
- ❑ Doesn't anyone read the literature?
e.g., permutation scanning, flash worms,
metaserver worms, topological, contagion
- ❑ Botched payloads the norm
e.g., Flooding-attack fizzles
- ❑ Current worm authors are in it for kicks ...
(... or testing) No arms race yet.

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Next-Generation Worm Authors

- ❑ Military.
- ❑ Crooks:
 - Denial-of-service, spamming for hire
 - "Access worms"
 - Very worrisome onset of blended threats
 - Worms + viruses + spamming + phishing + DOS-for-hire + botnets + spyware
- ❑ Money on the table ⇒ Arms race
 - (market price for spam proxies: 3-10¢/host/week)

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"Better" Payloads

- ❑ Wiping a disk costs \$550/\$2550*
- ❑ "A well-designed version of Blaster could have infected 10M machines." (8M+ for sure!)
- ❑ The same service exploited by Blaster has other vulnerabilities ...
- ❑ Potentially a lot more \$\$\$: flashing BIOS, corrupting databases, spreadsheets ...
- ❑ Lower-bound estimate: \$50B if well-designed

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Attacks on Passive Monitoring

- ❑ Exploits for bugs in read-only analyzers!
- ❑ Suppose protocol analyzer has an error parsing unusual type of packet
 - E.g., tcpdump and malformed options
- ❑ Adversary crafts such a packet, overruns buffer, causes analyzer to execute arbitrary code

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Witty

- ❑ Released March 19, 2004.
- ❑ Single UDP packet exploits flaw in the passive analysis of Internet Security Systems products.
- ❑ "Bandwidth-limited" UDP worm à la Slammer.
- ❑ Distribution:
 - Used a pre-populated list of ground-zero hosts.
 - Vulnerable pop. (12K) attained in 75 minutes.
- ❑ Payload:
 - First Internet worm to carry a destructive payload
 - Slowly corrupt random disk blocks.

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
Witty, con't

- ❑ Flaw had been announced the previous day.
- ❑ Telescope analysis reveals:
 - Initial spread seeded via a hit-list.
 - In fact, targeted a U.S. military base.
 - Analysis also reveals "Patient Zero", a European retail ISP.
- ❑ Written by a Pro.

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What kind of services are targeted

Services Scanned Over Time



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More information

- Timeline of virus and worms
 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_notable_computer_viruses_and_worms
- Early worms:
 - Eugene H. Spafford, The Internet Worm: Crisis and Aftermath, CACM 32(6) 678-687, June 1989
 - Page, Bob, "A Report on the Internet Worm", <http://www.ee.ryerson.ca:8080/~elf/hack/iworm.html>
- Summaries:
 - <http://www.icir.org/vern/talks.html>

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