

Locating Internet Routing Instabilities

Olaf Maennel

Technisch Universität München

Z. Morley Mao

University of Michigan

Anja Feldmann

Technische Universität München

Bruce Maggs


CMU / Akamai Technologies

Arthur Berger

MIT / Akamai Technologies

BGP

- Defacto standard inter-domain routing protocol
- Path vector protocol
- Policy routing protocol



- Topology changes, etc... ⇒ BGP updates

Definitions

➤ LOCATION:

either internal to an AS (e.g., inside AS1)
– or –
link between two ASes (e.g., AS1–AS2)

➤ INSTABILITY:

any change of BGP advertisement over
an e-BGP session

Why identify locations of instabilities?

- Instabilities can lead to
 - Unreachability / poor performance
 - Route oscillation
 - BGP churn
 - Black holes
 - ...

- Identifying the location enables corrective action

Causes of instabilities

- **Possible causes for BGP instabilities**
 - BGP session availability
 - Session establishment/teardown/reset
 - BGP session filters
 - BGP attribute or filter manipulation
 - misconfiguration
 - IGP cost change
 - IGP metric change, link or node failures
 - ... *(more in the paper)*

Outline

- High-level approach
- Limitations
- Evaluation

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- **High-level approach**
- Limitations
- Evaluation

High-level approach (I): Dimensions


Locate BGP instability by analyzing BGP updates along three dimensions:

1. **Time**
2. **Views**
3. **Prefixes**


We use same dimensions as:


- Caesar, Subramanian, Katz
- Chang, Govindan, Heidemann
- Lad, Nanavati, Massey, Zhang

Time



Views





High-level approach (II): Algorithms

- UNION heuristic (**Time**)
- INTERSECTION heuristic (**Views**)
- GREEDY heuristic (**Prefixes**)

UNION heuristic

- Routing instability ⇒
change from “previous” to “new” path

“previous best” path no longer available


– or –

“new best” path becomes available

⇒ **UNION of ASes as candidates**

- Input: BGP updates
- Output: “update bursts” with candidates

UNION heuristic



INTERSECTION heuristic


➤ Routing instability ⇒
changes at **multiple observation points**

⇒ **INTERSECTION** of candidate sets

➤ Input: “update bursts” with candidates


➤ Output: “events” with instability sets

INTERSECTION heuristic



Changes observable at multiple observation points

INTERSECTION heuristic



GREEDY heuristic

➤ Routing instability ⇒
changes **multiple prefixes**

⇒ **identify correlated prefixes**

- Input: “events” with instability sets
- Output: “correlated events”

GREEDY heuristic

Goal: Distinguish between multiple simultaneous instabilities.

1. Determine most popular AS edge in instability sets
 - For all events and for each edge in instability set
 - Counter{edge} ++
 - Sort edges by counter values
2. Chose edge with largest counter value as candidate AS edge for associated events
3. Remove these events from the input
4. Repeat


Outline

- High-level approach
- **Limitations**
- Evaluation

Problems with UNION heuristic


- Location may not be in the UNION at all!
⇒ may lead to empty INTERSECTION
- Size of candidate set may be large

Caution: induced updates




Policy: AS 4 prefers path over AS 3 instead of AS 6!

Caution: induced updates




Caution: induced updates




Reducing size of candidate set


- Idea: exclude some ASes
 - e.g., initial or final shared path segment
 - Narrows the candidate set, but may exclude the location



Caution on excluding candidate ASes



Caution on excluding candidate ASes



Good news

- Accurate in simulations
- Accurate when applied to real data
- Some formal justification in paper

Outline

- High-level approach
- Limitations
- **Evaluation**

Evaluation of methodology

➤ Simulation

Setup:

- Inferred AS topology from BGP data
- “Routescope” Simulator

➤ Data analysis


Setup:

- BGP routing table dumps and updates from RIPE, Routeviews, and Akamai
- Over 1,100 BGP feeds / 650 ASes (some I-BGP)

Simulation

- Topology
 - Inferred AS topology
 - Single node AS
- Policies
 - Inferred AS relationships
 - Prefer customer routes over peers over upstreams
 - Predicted routes agree with 90% of actual routes
- Link failures
 - Randomly selected
- Observation points
 - Randomly selected

Simulations: UNION + INTERSECTION




Choice of heuristic matters

Simulations: summary


- Location of observation points matter (in AS-hierarchy)
- Number of observation points matter
- Average instability sizes after intersection:
with only two obs.: ≤ 7 edges in 68%
with 10 obs.: ≤ 7 edges in 88%
- The methodology never excludes the simulated failure location

Data analysis: UNION+INTERSECTION



Number of observation points matter

Data analysis: UNION+INTERSECTION



More aggressive heuristics are dangerous

UNION + INTERSECTION + GREEDY

- Zipf's law seems to apply to the distribution of correlated events across prefixes
- Single AS edge identified for 93.4% of prefixes
- Three AS edges identified for 97.2% of prefixes
- If restricted to at least 100 correlated prefixes:
 - Single AS edge identified for 96.3% of prefixes

Validation

➤ **Syslog data of tier-1 vs. Greedy results**

- Crosscheck:
Session reset on router ⇒
event within 5 minutes
- Result:
 - Checked 35 events
 - Found 26 events ⇔ 74% of the events

Summary

➤ **Proposed methodology**

Time → Views → Prefixes

➤ **Ideal-world study: Simulation**

- UNION / INTERSECTION heuristics
≤ 7 AS edges for 88% (10 obs.)

➤ **Real-world study: Data analysis**

- UNION / INTERSECTION heuristics
 - Beacons: ≤ 3 AS edges for 76% (2 obs.)
 - All prefixes: ≤ 5 AS edges for 90% (5 obs.)
- UNION / INTERSECTION / GREEDY heuristic
 - All prefixes: 1 AS edge for 93.4%

➤ **Successful validation on tier-1 syslog data**