NETCO: RELIABLE ROUTING WITH UNRELIABLE ROUTERS

DISN 2016: The 2nd International Workshop on Dependability Issues on SDN and NFV

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AGENDA

1. SDN: Designing more dependable computer networks
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware
3. Attacker model: Bounded-collusion stealthy adversary
4. Robust Combiners
5. NetCo approach
6. Performance
7. Conclusion
1. SDN: Designing more dependable computer networks

SDN Data Plane

- Reduced switch complexity, from “hard-coded” logic to software => manufacturer independence, faster innovations

Opportunities for designing more dependable computer networks:

- Switches: cheap, “dumb”, only forwarding devices => exchangeable, easier to secure

- Formal reasoning about the function provided by the network and its correctness => a crucial prerequisite of any reliable network

BUT still:

- SDN security critically depends on the correctness of the hardware => requires reliable switches
While “SYNful Knock” is the latest identified malware targeting Cisco devices running Cisco IOS, we have identified and investigated six other malware incidents during the last four years that target Cisco devices running Cisco IOS. The nature of threats is evolving and Cisco will continue to adapt technology delivering trustworthy solutions that our customers can rely on. This also means that customers will need to evolve, fully utilizing the security tools that are available, as well as ensuring security best practices are in place.
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware

**Huawei HG8245 backdoor and remote access**

*Posted on Dec 09 2013 | Plain text version*

**Summary**

The Huawei HG8245 ONT, firmware version V1R006C00S100 which provides cellular services, contains 3 severe vulnerabilities: two administrator accounts enabled by default and a public administration interface exposed to the Internet.

**Description**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Huawei HG8245</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardware version:</td>
<td>130C4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software version:</td>
<td>V1R006C00S100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of publication:</td>
<td>12/09/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity:</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution:</td>
<td>Disable WAN-side HTTP and Telnet access. It is not possible to change the default web administrator’s password for the user admin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The backdoor is a web management account enabled by default and the password cannot be changed. In this version the default administrator password is:

```
admin:*6P0N4dm1nP4SS*
```

Another administrator user exists by default for the telnet service:

```
root:admin
```
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware

IMPORTANT JUNIPER SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT

CUSTOMER UPDATE: DECEMBER 20, 2015

Administrative Access (CVE-2015-7755) only affects ScreenOS 6.3.0r17 through 6.3.0r20. VPN Decryption (CVE-2015-7756) only affects ScreenOS 6.2.0r15 through 6.2.0r18 and 6.3.0r12 through 6.3.0r20.

We strongly recommend that all customers update their systems and apply these patched releases with the highest priority.

POSTED BY BOB WORRALL, SVP CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER ON DECEMBER 17, 2015

Juniper is committed to maintaining the integrity and security of our products and wanted to make customers aware of critical patched releases we are issuing today to address vulnerabilities in devices running ScreenOS® software.

During a recent internal code review, Juniper discovered unauthorized code in ScreenOS that could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access to NetScreen® devices and to decrypt VPN connections. Once we identified these vulnerabilities, we launched an investigation into the matter, and worked to develop and issue patched releases for the latest versions of ScreenOS.
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware

During a penetration test, RedTeam Pentesting discovered a vulnerability in the management web interface of an Alcatel-Lucent OmniSwitch 6450. This interface uses easily guessable session IDs, which allows attackers to authenticate as a currently logged-in user and perform administrative tasks.

Source: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-003/-alcatel-lucent-omniswitch-web-interface-weak-session-id
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware

Datacenter Scenario with fat tree topology
2. Problem: Relying on untrusted networking hardware
3. Attacker model: Bounded-collusion stealthy adversary

Adversarial switch may perform the following attacks:

- Rerouting
- Mirroring
- Packet Modification
- Stealthy Denial-of-Service (DoS)
4. Robust Combiners

- Inspired by the robust combiner concept known from cryptography

Tolerant Combiners: Resilient Cryptographic Design

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Abstract. Cryptographic schemes are often designed as a combination of multiple component cryptographic modules. Such a combiner design is tolerant for a (security) specification if it meets the specification, provided that a sufficient subset of the components meet their specifications. The archtypical combiner is cascade, and we show that it is indeed a tolerant combiner for encryption schemes, under chosen plaintext

Received 29 Aug 2002, published @ CT-RSA 2005
5. NetCo approach

- Constructions allowing to detect malicious behaviour and prevent it

![Diagram showing a network with nodes labeled HUB, OF-Switch1, OF-Switch2, OF-Switch3, and Compare.]

Only for exemplification: Unidirectional schematic representation
5. NetCo approach

Exemplification: Port-centric bidirectional schematic representation
5. NetCo approach
5. NetCo approach
6. Performance

- **Linespeed**: The simplest abstraction of our testing topology features only h1, s1, r3, s2 and h2. A benchmark for the ideal performance, which informs our expectations.

- **Central3**: The full prototype implementation, featuring k = 3 test routers.

- **Central5**: The full prototype implementation, featuring k = 5 test routers.

- **POX3**: A reference implementation of NetCo as a SDN application running on the POX controller.

- **Dup3**: Nodes s1 and s2 act as hubs, duplicate packets are not removed. Three test routers are put in a parallel circuit.

- **Dup5**: Nodes s1 and s2 act as hubs, duplicate packets are not removed. Five test routers are put in a parallel circuit.
6. Performance

TCP throughput  

UDP throughput
7. Conclusion: Four examples reloaded

- CISCO
- Huawei
- Juniper
- Alcatel-Lucent
7. Conclusion: Reliable routing on unreliable networks

- Detection and prevention: bounded-collusion stealthy adversary
- Prototype: Very early stage of NetCo
- Robust combiner concept: create efficient, low-cost yet resilient networks, from untrusted network devices
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